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Cartelization in the New Deal: 
Orange Marketing Orders 
Elizabeth Hoffman and Gary D. Libecap 
Yet,  in our generation we have seen scarcity vanquished, and our 
ever present fear, so far as agriculture is concerned, is a fear of over 
abundance. We wish, if not for scarcity, at least for relief from price 
depressing surpluses. 
Rexford G.  Tugwell. assistant secretary of  agriculture' 
6.1  Introduction 
Virtually  no aspect of  agriculture has been  excluded from some form of 
federal regulation, ranging from output restrictions, price supports, and mar- 
keting controls to international trade programs.? Although there were limited 
federal programs for alleviating agricultural distress in the 1920s, current regu- 
lation dates from the New Deal programs initiated by the Agricultural Adjust- 
ment Act (AAA) of  12 May  1933.j Federal agricultural policies share similar 
origins with regulations elsewhere in the economy. As noted by Cass Sunstein 
in his article on New Deal regulation, a disproportionate share of current regu- 
latory policies and agencies dates from the decade between 1930 and  1940.' 
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1. Quoted in Perkins 1969, 10. 
2. See Lenard and Mazur 1985 for a critical evaluation of the social costs of marketing orders. 
A more general evaluation of  government intervention into agricultural markets is provided by 
Gardner 1981, 1993. 
3. Agriculrurul Adjusrment Act of  1933, U.S. Statutes or  Large 48:3 I. For discussion of agricul- 
tural policies in the 1920s and the characteristics of the products that were regulated, see Hoffman 
and Libecap 1991. 
4. Sunstein (1987,424)  points out that eleven regulatory agencies were created from the framing 
of  the Constitution to  1865; twenty-four were added in the sixty-five years between  1865 and 
1929; but over seventeen were added in the relatively short period  1930-40. 
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Faced with rapidly falling agricultural prices and farm incomes, President 
Roosevelt and the Congress passed the AAA to cartelize the industry.’ The aim 
of  the new agricultural  policy  was to raise farm prices to parity  with those 
reached during August  1909 to July 1914. Between 1919 and 1933, wholesale 
farm prices had fallen by 67 percent, whereas over the same period nonagricul- 
tural wholesale prices had fallen by 45 percent. Moreover, the fall in agricul- 
tural prices was particularly  severe after  1929.6 The goal of the price-fixing 
policy was equity for agriculture, and the policy was asserted to be in the pub- 
lic interest because prosperous  farmers would contribute to the general eco- 
nomic recovery.’ The emphasis on raising prices was made clear in congres- 
sional debates over the AAA: “the present acute economic emergency being 
in part the consequence of a severe and increasing disparity between the prices 
of agricultural and other commodities, which disparity has largely destroyed 
the purchasing power of  farmers for industrial products, has broken down the 
orderly exchange of commodities.”8 
There was disagreement within the administration  as to the best means for 
increasing prices: production controls as advocated by Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry A. Wallace and by the second administrator of the Agricultural Adjust- 
ment Administration,  Chester  C. Davis, or domestic shipment  controls and 
greater exports as advocated by George N. Peek, the first administrator of  the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration.’  In either case, whether the emphasis 
was on regulating inputs (land) or outputs (amount marketed),  the objective 
was to reduce domestic supply to inflate prices to the targeted parity levels.  lo 
For basic commodities, such as wheat, corn, and cotton, acreage reductions 
were implemented as production controls, whereas for specialty crops, such as 
oranges,  interstate  shipment  restrictions  were  adopted  under  marketing 
agreements.  I  I 
The AAA delegated regulatory authority to officials in the Agricultural Ad- 
justment Administration, who were to negotiate the details of production and 
shipment controls with industry representatives. Given the crisis, these negoti- 
ations were expected to proceed quickly and be relatively smooth. Major oppo- 
sition was not anticipated. Great faith was placed in the abilities of technically 
5. For discussion of the AAA, see Murphy 1955; Shover 1965; Perkins 1965, 1969. 
6. U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 199-200. 
7. Nourse, Davis, and Black 1937, 20. 
8. Quoted in ibid., 17. 
9. These notions were embodied in the McNary-Haugen acts of the 1920s. Exports of  oranges 
did rise in the 1930s, but the export share of total production remained similar to that of the 1920s 
(U.S. Department of  Agriculture  1942, 235). In contrast, others, such as agricultural economist 
John Black, saw a need to sharply reduce production. These conflicting views were represented in 
the AAA’s  separate provisions for general and specialty crops. For discussion, see Irons  1982, 
11  1-55. 
10. There is no question of the cartelizing goal of the AAA, although some authors have wanted 
to downplay the price-fixing aspects of  agricultural regulation. See Perkins 1969, I, 3, 33; Nourse 
1935, 315-16;  Nourse, Davis, and Black 1937, 117; Schultz 1949, 141. 
11. Marketing agreements also used quality controls and shipping holidays. 191  Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal 
trained  administrators  to devise policies  that  would  raise  prices and restore 
farm income. Indeed, in his examination  of  New  Deal policies, Peter Irons 
noted that officials in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration  “were con- 
fident almost to the point of cockiness that the farm problem would yield to 
their reformist zeal and technical skills.” 
Accordingly,  in what  represented  a fundamental break with past policies, 
the federal government in  1933 was prepared to cartelize agricultural  output 
or shipments to raise prices.” The purpose of this paper is to show why even 
government-sponsored cartelization  was unable to reach parity-price  goals in 
the  1930s. By  1940, wholesale prices for nonfarm goods reached 91 percent 
of  their  1929 levels; however, agricultural  prices remained  at 65 percent of 
those in  1929. Further, through 1940, the ratio of agricultural prices to general 
prices remained  well  below those  reached during the parity  period  1909 to 
1914.14 The production  and  marketing  controls put  into place  by  the AAA 
failed to substantially reduce market supply. For general commodities, such as 
wheat, corn, and cotton, acreage was reduced marginally, but output grew due 
to a rise in yields, as farmers substituted capital and labor for land.I5 Participa- 
tion rates in government programs also varied, with a substantial fraction pro- 
ducing outside of the output restrictions.  Dramatic actions taken by  the Ag- 
ricultural  Adjustment  Administration  in  1933, such  as  the plow  down  of 
between  25 and 50 percent of each state’s cotton acreage and an emergency 
hog slaughter, brought widespread criticism of  the agency.“’ Even so, farm in- 
comes rose due to government transfer payments, credit subsidies, and price- 
support programs that emphasized government purchases of  “excess supplies,” 
rather than from successful cartelization. 
We focus on orange marketing  agreements to show why the cartelization 
of agriculture under the AAA failed. Marketing agreements for oranges were 
12. Irons 1982, 125. As Sunstein (1987,441)  summarizes, “[Tlhe enduring legacy of the period 
is the insulated administrator, immersed in  a particular area of expertise, equipped  with broad 
discretion, and expected to carry out a set of  traditionally separated functions.” For other discus- 
sion of  the overconfidence of  early reformers, see Perkins  1969, 4; Nourse, Davis, and Black 
1937,285. 
13. See Perkins 1969, I, 19-28. 
14. U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 200. For 1909-14,  the ratio of farm wholesale prices to all 
wholesale prices averaged 1.04; in  1929, the ratio was  1.10; in 1933, it was .78: and in  1940, it 
was .86. 
15. The literature is uniform in concluding that the output and market controls of the AAA were 
unsuccessful. Schultz (1949, 143) points out that, although corn acreage fell by 8 percent between 
1937 and  1939, output grew by  17 percent. A severe drought in  1933 helped to reduce wheat 
production that year.  For assessments, see Nourse, Davis, and  Black  1937, 289-320;  Benedict 
1955,443-44. 
16. Perkins 1969, 103, 140. 
17. The Commodity Credit Corporation purchased  “excess” stocks and provided subsidized 
credit.  Benefit payments were  made  for reducing  acreage,  and  price  support  programs  were 
adopted. Schultz (1949, 154) shows that supplementary government payments in  1939 were as 
much as a quarter of  total farm income. Nourse, Davis, and Black (1937, 285) suggest that one- 
fourth of the increase in farm income in  1933 was due to transfer payments, two-thirds in  1934, 
and one-half in  1935. See a150  Rucker and Alston 1987. 192  Elizabeth Hoffman and Gary D. Libecap 
implemented  I8 December 1933, among the first marketing  agreements put 
into place. Among agricultural products, specialty crops, such as oranges, of- 
fered the greatest potential for a successful cartelization  policy. There were 
many reasons for optimism: there were relatively  fewer growers than existed 
for general commodities; production  was concentrated in a few isolated  re- 
gions; there was a consensus among orange growers that government carteliza- 
tion was necessary (between 1930 and 1933, nominal orange prices had fallen 
by  75 percent, whereas the consumer price index had fallen by  22 percent); 
established,  formal  cooperatives,  such as  the California Fruit  Growers Ex- 
change (CFGE), existed to implement the marketing agreements; and oranges 
were a perishable  crop that limited the buildup of  inventories that could de- 
press prices.18  If a government-enforced cartel could not succeed for oranges 
where conditions  were more favorable, similar arrangements certainly  were 
doomed for the general commodities. 
Under AAA, the secretary of agriculture could issue a marketing agreement 
if 50 percent of the shippers and two-thirds of the growers in the state agreed 
to the provisions. l9  The marketing agreements authorized the secretary to limit 
interstate orange shipments through weekly allotments to shippers that were 
enforced  through revokable  shipping  licenses and fines of  $1,000 for viola- 
tion.?” Violators  were  to be  prosecuted  by  the Justice  Department, and  the 
agreements  were exempted  from antitrust regulations.  The weekly  shipping 
quotas were to be determined  by  industry boards in California and Florida, 
based  on estimates  of  supply  and  demand consistent with  targeted  prices. 
There were provisions in the law for national prorationing of total orange ship- 
ments by region.  With national  prorationing,  a national control commission 
was to be established to assign state quotas and prorate shipments among the 
states throughout the growing season. Excess production was to be diverted to 
other uses, such as by-products (livestock feed) or foreign markets.?’ 
Despite this framework, an orange cartel was not established  as described 
by the AAA. National  prorationing among the producing  regions was never 
adopted. Further, there were sharp differences in the industry response to the 
18. Nominal orange prices are from Manthy  1978, 47-52,  and the consumer price index and 
all-food price index are from U.S.  Bureau of the Census 1975,211. For other discussion of market- 
ing orders, see U.S.  General Accounting Office  1976; Hallagan 1985; Cave and Salant 1987. 
19. For California oranges, the required percentages were 80 percent of  the shippers and 75 
percent of the growers (Nourse, Davis, and Black 1937, 234). 
20. The original agreements were voluntary. In the face of noncompliance, they were supple- 
mented with marketing orders issued by the secretary of  agriculture as authorized by amendments 
to the AAA, 24 August 1935. These marketing orders were binding on all growers and interstate 
shippers of the commodity covered by the agreement (ibid., 23 1-34).  By 1980, only one marketing 
agreement for peanuts had not been supplanted by a marketing order. The marketing agreement 
for peanuts is still in effect because of successful enforcement by the secretary of agriculture. For 
discussion, see Vetne 1981, 87-100.  Here we use the terms “marketing agreements” and “market- 
ing orders” interchangeably. 
21. Between  1933 and  1955, seventeen marketing agreements and orders were established for 
fresh fruits, as were eleven for vegetables and twelve for canned and dried fruits (Benedict and 
Stine 1956, 383-86). 193  Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal 
marketing agreements proposed by  the secretary of  agriculture for California 
and Florida. California growers and shippers accepted their  1933 marketing 
agreement  with weekly  prorationing of  interstate orange shipments,  and al- 
though  some modifications  were made, the basic thrust of  these regulations 
remained intact through December  1 992.?’ Growers and shippers in Florida, 
however, rejected a 1933 marketing agreement that was virtually  identical to 
that implemented in California. It was terminated in 1934. Between  1934 and 
1937, two other marketing agreements were executed by the secretary of agri- 
culture for Florida but terminated, before an acceptable arrangement could be 
devised  in  1939.”  The final Florida  marketing order did not  involve prora- 
tioning of orange shipments. Instead, it relied on temporary shipping holidays 
and adjustable size and quality controls to limit interstate shipments. Florida 
never adopted weekly prorationing of orange shipments as practiced in Cali- 
fornia. Under these circumstances, orange prices did not rise to parity levels, 
although tight prorationing controls in California and the use of shipping holi- 
days in Florida appear to have moderated price fluctuations in the 1930s com- 
pared to those in the 1920s. 
We do not claim that cartel success was guaranteed had Florida responded 
in  the same way  as California to the marketing agreements.  Other problems 
caused by  falling incomes and entry  would have plagued  the orange cartel. 
Real personal income in the United States fell by 28 percent between 1929 and 
1933, and such shifts in demand would have forced recalculation of individual 
shipper and state  For oranges with a likely  high income elasticity, 
falling income and demand would have been an especially difficult problem.25 
Further, New Deal agricultural  programs failed to deal with the problem  of 
entry, and between 1933 and 1940, as shown in table 6.1, total orange acreage 
and production  in California and Florida grew by  21 percent and 79 percent, 
respectively.26 
22. In  1989, there were forty-six active marketing orders for a variety of fruits, vegetables, and 
nuts under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (Powers 1990, 6). In December  1992, the 
Bush administration discontinued weekly prorationing of interstate orange shipments in Califor- 
nia. The CalifomidArizona marketing order for oranges was split into separate ones for navel and 
Valencia oranges in 1953 (navels) and 1954 (Valencias). The marketing orders were temporarily 
suspended by  the Reagan administration during the 1984-85  season. For discussion, see Powers 
1990; Thompson and Lyon  1989. 
23. The 1939 Florida marketing order remained in operation for fresh fruit shipment in Florida. 
See Powers  1990. By the late  1950s. most Florida orange production, however, went to juice 
concentrate and was outside the marketing order. 
24.  U.S. Bureau of  the Census  1975, 225. Quota negotiations and enforcement are difficult 
enough as it is without having to deal with demand shifts. For discussion of quota problems in 
another context, see Johnson and Lihecap 1982. 
25. If higher prices were to result in higher revenues and income, price elasticities had to be 
relatively low. Nourse, Davis, and Black (1937, 400) discuss the role of price elasticities in the 
success of  the AAA. Although per capita consumption of  oranges grew in the  192Os, oranges 
remained a “luxury’’ fruit compared to apples, peaches, or other competitors. 
26. The problems of designing quotas and of  obtaining support for output and shipping controls 
were not discussed in detail in congressional debates or in hearings that focused on the general 
crops provisions of the AAA. See Murphy 1955. Table 6.1  Orange Acreage and Production 
























Acreage  U.S. Share  Output  US.  Share 
(1,000s)  (470)  (1,000s of boxes)  (%) 
52.8  24  7,550  31 
57.7  26  8,700  27 
65.1  28  7,850  35 
74.0  29  10,150  32 
87.7  32  13,150  35 
106.2  37  10,400  36 
109.2  38  9,500  28 
123.5  40  10,100  26 
126.2  40  8,650  27 
129.3  40  15,000  27 
133.0  40  8,950  29 
140.0  40  16,800  32 
155.0  42  12,200  25 
169.0  43  14,500  29 
178.6  44  15,900  35 
187.3  44  15,600  25 
195.7  44  15,900  32 
202.4  45  19,100  37 
208.5  45  23,900  33 
213.5  45  29.900  40 
216.2  45  25,000  34 
226.0  45  28,600  35 
Acreage  U.S. Share  Output  U.S. Share 
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Nevertheless, we do claim that if  Florida had accepted the 1933 marketing 
agreement  and joined California in nationwide prorationing  of  orange ship- 
ments, orange prices  likely  would  have  risen  with  more effective  shipment 
control. Moreover,  incumbent growers in both  California and Florida could 
have directed more attention to the problem of entry. Peanut growers eventually 
were able to obtain quite restrictive marketing  quota^.^' As it was, for orange 
growers throughout the  1930s, the key question was whether any marketing 
agreement could be put into place in Florida. 
By chronicling the conflicts within Florida and the negotiations between the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Florida industry over succes- 
sive marketing agreements, we show how difficult cartels are to assemble and 
maintain even when there is enabling legislation for cartelization, a supportive 
agency anxious to cartelize, and industry agreement  on broad policy  goals. 
The distributional  effects  of  the  proposed  quotas  proved  too formidable  to 
overcome.  The close relationship  between the Agricultural  Adjustment  Ad- 
ministration  and the CFGE is examined  to explain  why  the Department  of 
Agriculture was so persistent in holding to the California model of regulation, 
despite continued opposition in Florida. This relationship helps to explain why 
California continued to comply with federal cartelization efforts in the face of 
repeated noncompliance by many Florida shippers.28 
6.2  The Nature of the Orange Industry in the 1930s and Cartelization 
through Federal Regulation 
In the  1920s and  193Os, the CalifornidArizona and Florida orange indus- 
tries competed in the fresh fruit market.29  Until the 1940s and the development 
of  new technology for frozen concentrates and hot-pack juice for soft drinks 
and  canned  juice,  there  was  little  use  for  oranges  in  juice  or  other  by- 
California produced two kinds of oranges: winter navels with a sea- 
son of October to June and summer Valencias with a season from May through 
October. Florida produced at least five varieties, all during the winter season: 
Parson  Brown and Hamlin  (October-December),  Homosassa  and Pineapple 
27. See Benedict and Stine 1956, 147-57,  and Rucker and Thurman 1990 for discussion of the 
peanut program. 
28. As an alternative to the orange case, see discussion of the raisin marketing agreement by 
Saker  1992; Powers  1990, 3; Armbruster and Jesse 1983, 129; Vetne  1981, 97; Ockey  1936, 5. 
For discussions of other marketing orders, see Hallagan 1985 for hops. Marketing agreements for 
milk involved considerable conflict within the industry, especially between large and small produc- 
ers. See Irons 1982, 149-55. 
29. The third region of citrus production, Texas, was especially important for grapefruit;  oranges 
were less important. The Texas industry response to the adoption of marketing agreements in 1933 
fell between that observed in Florida and that observed in CalifornidArizona. We do not examine 
Texas in this study. 
30. Thompson 1938, 28-29;  Reuther, Webber, and Batchelor 1967, 36. 196  Elizabeth Hoffman and Gary D. Libecap 
(January-March),  and  Valencia  (April-June).3i  Storage possibilities  at  this 
time were limited, especially for Florida fruit. Because of climate conditions, 
Florida oranges did not store well on the tree and had to be harvested quickly 
in order to avoid fruit drop. In California, because  of relatively  cool nights, 
oranges could be stored on the tree for two to three months.32  Accordingly, all 
Florida oranges competed with California navels, whereas California Valen- 
cias generally did not compete directly with any other orange. 
To underscore the competition between Florida oranges and California navel 
oranges, figure 6.1 presents the differences in the log of weekly California and 
Florida per box orange prices in New York City for the 1926-27  and 1927-28 
seasons. The differences trend toward zero, as would be the case if the oranges 
were close substitutes.’’ 
Table 6.1  lists acreage and production  for California  and Florida between 
1919 and 1941. As the table shows, during the 1919-20  season California had 
approximately 73 percent of U.S. orange acreage and 68 percent of U.S. pro- 
duction, whereas Florida had 24 percent and 31 percent, respectively. By the 
1940-41  season, California’s acreage and production  shares had fallen to 46 
percent and 61 percent, whereas Florida’s shares had increased to 4.5  percent 
and 3.5 percent. Florida acreage increased with the planting of new trees, but 
there was a lag of  five to six years between planting  and production, which 
partially explains the lower production levels in that state. 
Both Florida and California growers had similar objectives for securing gov- 
ernment intervention into the orange market in the 1930s. Orange growers and 
the Department of Agriculture in 1933 agreed that controls on shipments were 
necessary if  prices were to be increased. For an understanding  of the subse- 
quent regulations that were adopted and of  the relative positions taken by the 
California and Florida orange industries, it is important to note the critical role 
taken by California growers and shippers in lobbying for and molding federal 
regulation. They were well organized under the CFGE, the major pooling and 
marketing organization in the state with approximately 75 percent of the Cali- 
fornia orange crop, and the Mutual Orange Distributors (MOD) with another 
15 percent of the crop. Both organizations were major advocates of federal and 
state regulation.34 
In  1932, the two organizations cooperated in a private arrangement that con- 
trolled shipments of Valencia oranges by prorating shipments weekly and that 
provided the prototype for the marketing agreements.35  Further, the California 
3 1. For discussion of  orange types, their seasons, and  production, see Reuther, Webber, and 
32. Reuther, Wcbber, and Batchelor 1967,437-84:  Webber and Batchelor 1943, 82. 
33. The per box prices were taken from the New] Yurk Times from 24 October 1926 through 26 
June  1927 for the  1926-27  season, and from  29 October  1927 through 22 June  1928 for the 
1927-28  season. These seasons were chosen because they were in the preregulation period. The 
log of Florida prices was subtracted from the log of California prices. 
Batchelor  1967,66,  74: Shulcr and Townsend  1948, 9-1  1: Thompson  1938,7. 
34. Citrugruph, April  1933, 161,  167. 
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Prorate Act that created a state agency for intrastate regulation of shipments 
of specialty crops was considered in the California legislature at the urging of 
the CFGE and other cooperatives in April 1933 and enacted on 5 June 1933, 
approximately the same time that Congress was passing the AAA.36  As  dis- 
cussed in the trade journal Citrus Leaves (July 1933, 3,4, 14-20),  the Califor- 
nia Prorate Act had provisions for marketing orders that were very similar to 
those in the AAA. These included industry committees to determine weekly 
prorationing quotas, voting procedures to implement regulation, and revokable 
shipping certificates for shippers. 
By contrast, the Florida orange industry was much less organized. The Flor- 
ida Citrus Exchange (FCE), a pooling and marketing organization  similar to 
the CFGE, handled only about 25 percent of the Florida orange crop."  Further, 
no state prorationing legislation was enacted in Florida. 
Other California organizations, such as the California Farm Bureau Federa- 
tion, also were active in lobbying for marketing agreements for specialty crops 
36. Cirrus Leaves, April  1933, 5-7;  July 1933, 3,4, 14-20. 
37. Spurlock 1943. 198  Elizabeth Hoffman and Gary D. Libecap 
under the AAA.38 Close personal  and philosophical  ties between  the CFGE 
and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration  were quickly established. In 
Senate hearings, George N. Peek, a proponent of the agricultural cooperative 
movement, proposed the marketing agreement amendments for the AAA.” In 
addition, Howard Tolley, director of the Giannini Foundation at the University 
of California at Berkeley, which worked closely with the CFGE and other Cali- 
fornia agricultural cooperatives, was named chief of the Special Crops Section 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. The Special Crops Section was 
responsible for negotiating with the industry and for drafting and implement- 
ing the marketing  agreement^.^" As noted by Edwin Nourse, Tolley “was thor- 
oughly familiar with the problems of California fruit and vegetable producers 
and with the developments in that state leading up to the passage of a proration 
law analogous in its operation to the marketing agreement feature of the Ag- 
ricultural Adjustment Act.”“  Further reinforcing this link between the two or- 
ganizations, in  1934, H. R. Wellman  of the Giannini Foundation  was named 
chief of the General (formerly Special) Crops Section of the Agricultural Ad- 
justment Administration. 
The sharing of personnel and the subsequent close collaboration among the 
CFGE, the FCE, and the Agricultural Adjustment  Administration  in control- 
ling market supplies reflected long-standing efforts by the Department of Agri- 
culture  to  promote  agricultural  cooperatives  that  could  fix  prices.  Indeed, 
throughout the 192Os, the Department of Agriculture had assisted cooperatives 
in marketing  their crops and in controlling  supplies through  stockpiles and 
exports.42  Department officials believed that through independent planting de- 
cisions farmers tended  to “overproduce,”  but  that through  cooperative deci- 
sions output and shipments could be re~tricted.~~  Well-structured agricultural 
cooperatives, such as the CFGE, not only embodied coordinated production 
and marketing so favored by  the department, but their existence reduced the 
number of parties with which the department had to deal in administering regu- 
lations. Falling relative agricultural prices in the early 1930s, however, demon- 
strated that private cooperative organizations alone could not muster sufficient 
control of the market to limit supplies and raise prices. Collaboration between 
the Department of Agriculture and agricultural cooperatives was seen as neces- 
sary for implementing successful regulations.u 
38. Nourse 1935, 15; Blaisdell 1940, 40-43. 
39. Perkins 1969, 32. 
40. Nourse 1935, 28; Perkins 1969, 94. 
41. Nourse  1935, 28. 
42. These actions to promote farmer cooperatives and raise prices were promoted by a series of 
laws enacted or considered during the  1920s: the Capper-Volstead Act of  1922 (U.S. Statutes ar 
Large 42:388), the Cooperative Marketing Act of  1926 (U.S.  Statures at Large 44:802), the Ag- 
ricultural Marketing Act of  1929 (U.S. Statures at Large 46:11), and the McNary-Haugen bills 
of  1924-28. 
43. See Hoffman and Libecap 1991 for discussion. 
44. Breimyer 1983, 335-43;  Perkins 1969, 8.21-24. 199  Political Bargaining and Carteliaation in the New Deal 
Throughout  the  summer  of  1933, orange producers  and  shippers  from 
CalifornidArizona, Florida, and Texas met with the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration personnel in Washington, D.C., to draft marketing agreements 
for their respective states and to conclude a national prorationing agreement. 
The representatives of the CFGE lobbied hard for national prorationing with 
fixed state quotas and a national price stabilization plan  (national carteliza- 
tion). They offered their draft marketing agreement for adoption by  the Ag- 
ricultural Adjustment Adrnini~tration.~~ 
At the  20  July  1933 Washington  meeting,  California had nine delegates, 
Texas had nine, Arizona had one, but Florida had thirty-seven because of dif- 
ferences in opinion  within the state as to the nature of  the proposed regula- 
tions.Jh Indeed, the variety of  views held by  the Florida delegates reflected a 
problem that was of concern to the Department of Agriculture because Florida 
did not  follow the cooperative model of  California espoused by the depart- 
ment. The Florida industry  presented  at least two competing draft marketing 
agreements,  one supported by  the FCE and  similar to that proposed  by  the 
CFGE, and one backed by the Florida Citrus Growers Clearing House Associa- 
tion (FCHA). Many of the independent growers and shippers in Florida were 
organized under the FCHA, and they did not enter into long-term sales con- 
tracts to pool fruit as practiced by  the cooperatives. The Department of Agri- 
culture supported and ultimately adopted the draft marketing agreements pro- 
posed by the CFGE and FCE that called for the weekly prorationing of orange 
shipments among shippers whose quotas would be based on season-long con- 
tracts for fruit.47  These long-term contracts were an integral part of the pooling 
agreements administered by  the CFGE and FCE. 
Importantly,  independent  shippers, who did not use a formal cooperative 
organization to contract with growers, would not have been able to get shipping 
quotas under the arrangements proposed by the CFGE and the FCE. Such ship- 
pers, who were particularly prevalent in Florida, tended to engage in spot pur- 
chases of fruit and would not have had fruit under contract at the beginning of 
the season, when quotas were to be assigned under the marketing agreement. 
The adoption of  this quota arrangement in  1933 by  the Agricultural  Adjust- 
ment Administration after negotiating with representatives of the  California 
and Florida industries was an effort to require growers and shippers in Florida 
to join the FCE.48 
45. Nourse  1935, 133, 159; Cirrus Industry, August  1933, 10, 14; October 1933, 10; Cirrus 
46. Citrus Leaves, August 1933, 20; Cirrus Indusrry, March 1934,26. 
47. Citrugraph, September 1933, 301. 
48. US. National Archives, Record Group 145, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Cen- 
tral Correspondence File, box 362: letters from James C. Morton, Florida Citrus Growers Clearing 
House Association, to Henry A. Wallace, 27 November 1933, 8 December  1933; telegram from 
James C. Morton, Florida Citrus Growers Clearing House Association, to J.  W. Tapp, Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, 10 December 1933; Letter from A. E. Fowler, Florida Control Com- 
mittee, to W.  G. Meal, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 19 December 1933, with the Flor- 
ida Marketing Agreement attached. 
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Not only did the Department of  Agriculture adopt a quota rule to encourage 
membership in the FCE, but the FCE was given a majority of the positions on 
the state administrative committee. Under the marketing agreement, Secretary 
of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace appointed the members of the Florida Control 
Committee that was set up to determine weekly shipping levels and to assign 
shipping quotas. Most of those selected were from the FCE. On the other hand, 
the CalifornidArizona marketing agreement allowed for the election of mem- 
bers of the administrative committees for that region.49 
Independent  shippers and growers  within  the  FCHA,  who  attended  the 
Washington meetings to draft the marketing agreements, understood the effect 
of the prorationing rule in requiring membership in pooling cooperatives. The 
department recommended that growers who were worried that their shippers 
would  not have quotas under the prorationing  rule link up with established 
shippers  who did.5" During  negotiations  in the fall of  1933, the FCHA de- 
manded that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration modify its proposed 
marketing agreement for Florida, because it would force independent shippers 
out  of  business.  The agency  refused,  arguing  that  the  agreement could be 
amended later if necessary. But, while ratification of the marketing agreement 
required concurrence of 50 percent of the shippers and two-thirds of the grow- 
ers, amendments required two-thirds concurrence of both groups. 
Despite their efforts, the FCHA could not block the marketing agreement 
negotiated by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the FCE. Since 
the agency used the California model for regulation, the marketing agreements 
imposed in the two states were virtually the same. Whereas there was substan- 
tial consensus in California for the marketing agreements, opposition in Flor- 
ida to the prorationing rule and to the Florida Control Committee appointed 
by the secretary of agriculture meant that additional negotiations would have 
to take place between  the agency  and the industry, delaying and modifying 
the proposed orange cartel. Negotiations between the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration  and the Florida industry continued for the rest of the decade 
before an agreement could be devised, but it did not lead to a cartel as de- 
scribed in the AAA. Due to the close ties between the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration and the large formal cooperatives, the agency was unwilling to 
make major concessions in the marketing agreement until 1939. The repeated 
efforts of the Department of  Agriculture after 1933 to impose regulations in 
Florida based on the California model explains the general adherence in Cali- 
49. Cirrus Industry, December 1933, 7, 10; Cirrus Leaves, October  1933,  3, 4, 11-20;  January 
1934, 1-2,  16. 
50. U.S. National Archives, Record Group 145, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Cen- 
tral Correspondence File, box 362: telegrams and letters from James C. Morton, Florida Citrus 
Growers Clearing House Association, to J. W. Tapp, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and 
R. G. Tugwell, USDA,  10 December  1933, 12 December  1933; letter from thirteen growers to 
Henry Wallace, USDA, 27 December 1933; letter from A. M. Prevatt, a Florida grower, to Henry 
Wallace, USDA, 28 December 1933; letter from 0. G. Strauss of the Florida Control Committee 
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fornia, despite opposition and violation in Florida. The marketing agreements 
provided federal enforcement of California regulations, and the California in- 
dustry expected that the department would eventually force Florida into com- 
pliance.” 
6.3  Modification of Regulation through Constituent-Agency 
Negotiations 
6.3.1  Modification of Regulation 
Table 6.2 summarizes the pattern of  regulation  of  orange shipments under 
the AAA and subsequent federal legislation through 1941. Notice that in Cali- 
fornia the original marketing  agreement, based on existing CFGE practices, 
remained in operation through  1947. The picture is very different in Florida. 
The first marketing agreement was terminated in August  1934; a second was 
adopted in December  1934 and terminated in July  1935; a third was imple- 
mented in May 1936 and terminated in July 1937; and a fourth that remained 
in effect was adopted in February 1939. 
It is notable how tenacious the Department of Agriculture was in holding to 
the California model of  regulation  in the first three marketing agreements in 
Florida. The department modified the prorationing rule in the second and third 
marketing orders to provide more opportunities for independent  shippers to 
obtain a quota. However, negotiations over six years ultimately led to a market- 
ing order without prorationing. In the final agreement, shipping controls were 
limited to shipping holidays and adjustable grade and size restrictions. Neither 
of these regulations required individual quotas or membership in agricultural 
cooperatives. State regulations in Florida for grading and classification were 
enacted in  1935.52  Hence by  1939, the model of cartelization of orange ship- 
ments through formal agricultural cooperatives as envisioned by  enthusiastic 
officials of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in 1933 had been dis- 
carded. 
6.3.2  The Effects of  Regulation 
AS with other New Deal agricultural programs, entry and expansion were 
not halted by the orange marketing agreements. As indicated by  the data in 
table 6.1, acreage and output grew between 1933 and 1940, especially in Flor- 
S  1. US. National Archives, Record Group 145, Agricultural  Adjustment Administration, Cen- 
tral Correspondence File, box 363: letter to P.  R. Taylor, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 
from A. W. Fowler, Florida Tentative Control Committee, 27 November 1933; letter tn P.  R. Taylor, 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, from 0. Strauss, USDA, Bureau of Agricultural Eco- 
nomics, 28 November 1933; box 362: letter from Eugene Dodd, attorney, to R. C. Butler, USDA, 
21 December 1933: letter and resolution to Henry Wallace from James C. Morton, Florida Citrus 
Growers Clearing House Association, 8 December 1933: box 363: memo to Chester C. Davis from 
H. R. Wellman, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 3 November 1934. 
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Table 6.2  The Pattern of Regulation of Orange Shipments 
Florida  California  National Prorationing 
1st murkrfing agreement  1st marketing cigreement  7/20/33  Meeting 
CFGE model for prorationing 
121  18/33-31 13134  I21 18/33-51 17147  national plan 
2d marketing agreemetit  9/79/33 Meetiizg 
Modified CFGE model for 
CFGE model for prorationing  Committee designed to draft a 
Plan details debated by the 
prorationing 
12118/34-7115135 
3d nictrkrting cigrrrment 
Modified CFGE model for 
prorationing 
518136-713  1137 
4th marketing tigrrrmerir 
Florida model with no 
prorationing, other forms of 
control 
2122139-1  9.55 
state\ 
1/6/34 Meeting 
No agreement on a plan or on 
a national coordinator 
6/18/34 Meeting 




National prorationing dropped 
Sources: Benedict and Stine 1956, 382-86;  Ockey  1936. 5-42;  Citru~  Industry, November  1933. 6;  Sep- 
tember 1935. 6; March  1936, 8; Citrus Lecnvs, November  1935, 6; April  1936, I. 
ida, where through new planting total acreage essentially equalled that of Cali- 
fornia by 1940. Florida production, however, remained substantially below that 
of California, due to more heterogeneous growing conditions and the immatu- 
rity of groves. We do not have data on actual interstate shipments in the 1930s, 
but the records of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in the National 
Archives, trade journal articles, and reports of the CFGE indicate that weekly 
prorationing of  orange shipments was practiced and strictly enforced in Cali- 
fornia after 1933. In Florida, shipment prorationing in the 1930s was intermit- 
tent at best, and regulation primarily involved periodic shipping holidays and 
adjustable size and quality controls. These placed fewer constraints on ship- 
ments from Florida, although with perishable fruit, a shipping holiday of a few 
days (the common practice) could result in a significant loss of  fruit suitable 
for shipment.s3 The marketing agreements did not  succeed  in raising  either 
nominal  or real  orange prices  to their  1920s levels,  but  the  path  of  prices 
53. The use of  prorationing, shipping holidays,  and grade and size restrictions as a means of 
influencing prices is discusscd by Powers (1990) and Bocksteal (1984, 1987). 
54. Lacking shipment data  and  obvious  unregulated  crops for comparison,  we  cannot  test 
whether the  marketing agreements alone smoothed prices. As  we  show in  the  text, marketing 
agreements in other contexts have  had  similar results. The federal government  also purchased 
“surplus” oranges to promote demand. Although the absolute amounts of purchases by the Federal 
Surplus Commodities Corporation do not appear to have been large (about 4 percent ofthe 1937- 
38 crop [Florida Citrus Inspection Bureau 1938, 157, 169]), if they were strategically timed, pur- 
chases could have prevented  short-term  price falls during heavy deliveries. 203  Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal 
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Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (1934, 516,517; 1940, 215, 216; 1942, 244). 
Seasonal mean prices for California and Florida oranges, 1925-26 to 
Figure 6.2 plots the pattern of seasonal mean nominal orange prices per box 
for Florida and California from the New York auction market for sixteen sea- 
sons from 1925-26 through 1940-41. The first eight seasons are before regula- 
tion  was  enacted in  1933, and  the last eight seasons are under federal and 
state  regulation^.^^ There is a noticeable moderation in price movements under 
regulation. The mean preregulation California price is $4.42 with a coefficient 
of variation of  .353. For Florida, the mean preregulation price is $4.25, with a 
coefficient of  variation of  ,353. The postregulation mean California price is 
$3.14, with a coefficient of variation of.  177, and the postregulation mean Flor- 
ida price is $2.65, with  a coefficient of  variation of  .227.56  Robert Manthy 
provides annual orange prices, and his series for the period 1920-40 reveals a 
55. The data are per box from the New York auction market as reported in U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 1934, 516, 517; 1940, 215, 216; 1942, 244. 
56. The mean prices and variances are significantly different across the two time periods for 
both states. Because the variances are not the same, the usual t-tests cannot be used to test for 
significant differences in the means. The Mann-Whitney U tests for differences in the means pro- 
vides z-statistics for differences in the means of  -5.99  for California and -8.03  for Florida. The 
F-statistics for differences in  the variances are 5.65 for California and 5.85 for Florida. All are 
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similar pattern  of price  level and variation between the pre- and postregula- 
tion  period^.^' 
6.4  Cartelization through Cooperative Pooling: Differences between 
California and Florida 
6.4.1  Cartelization Efforts and the Incentive to Pool 
In implementing marketing agreements under the AAA, the Department of 
Agriculture  relied  on the  existence of  formal  agricultural  cooperatives  and 
their seasonal pooling arrangements as means of regulating shipments. To un- 
derstand why the department placed so much emphasis on cooperative organi- 
zations, it is necessary to examine how pooling fit within the cartelization goals 
of the AAA. We examine why most California growers in 1933 were part of 
the season-long pools administered by  the CFGE or MOD, whereas Florida 
growers generally did not participate in such arrangements, and thus why the 
department  had  so much  difficulty  in  implementing  marketing  agreements 
based on seasonal pooling in Florida. 
Under  formal cooperative pooling  arrangements,  growers combined  their 
output over a stated period and obtained the average price received by the pool. 
Under these private arrangements, pooling was not designed to cartelize but to 
spread the risk of  seasonal price fluctuation among growers, lower shipping 
costs if  there were economies of  scale in shipping, and improve marketing, 
since known quantities and qualities of fruit could be delivered to particular 
destinations throughout the season.sx  With large enough market shares in par- 
ticular markets, the cooperative pooling association could capture many of the 
returns to those activities. Seasonal pooling required relatively long-term con- 
tracts between growers and shippers to provide specified quantities and quali- 
ties throughout the length of the pool. Usually, pooling agreements were estab- 
lished at the beginning of the season with allocations or quotas to each grower 
based  upon  past  years’  contributions  to the  pool. Provisions  were  made to 
allow for new entry and adjustment of individual quotas. 
An established pooling agreement, however, became a ready-made vehicle 
for regulatory controls on shipments under the AAA, since restrictions on de- 
liveries could be imposed on the pooling organization and then prorated across 
the contributing growers and their shippers. The assignment and management 
of individual growerkhipper cartel quotas could be accomplished within the 
existing  structure of  the pool. Policing involved insuring that the pooling or- 
ganization adhered to the quantities authorized by the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration. If  a single or at least a small number of pooling organizations 
57. Manthy 1978,47752. Marketing agreements appear to have stabilized prices for other crops 
58. There were no futures markets in fresh oranges at this time, so pooling provided a means of 
at different times. See Jamison 1971, 241-85. 
spreading the risk of price fluctuation. See Hoffman 1932.54-55. 205  Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal 
existed in each state, then nationwide  shipping controls would have involved 
assigning quotas to each organization and monitoring compliance. This essen- 
tially is what happened in California. As long as the pooling organization re- 
tained  the  support  of  growers,  it provided  the  mechanism for reducing the 
transactions costs of implementing and monitoring the marketing agreements. 
These attributes of cooperative pools help to explain why the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration sought to promote membership in organized coop- 
eratives, such as the FCE, in the design of the marketing agreements. To under- 
stand why the California model for marketing agreements was accepted in that 
state but rejected  in Florida, it is necessary to examine both the differential 
incentives to engage in seasonal pools in the two states, and why distributional 
issues in quota assignment played a greater role in Florida than in California. 
Figure 6.3A illustrates some of the incentives for growers to pool their crops 
in the absence of futures markets. Assume that a set of risk-averse producers 
faces a common distribution  of  prices  for their product  over the producing 
season. The price distribution has a lower bound of p  and an upper bound of 
p. This generates a profit distribution for firm i of  [~jp),  ~,(p)].  Firm i’s risk- 
averse utility function over profits is represented by theconcave function U,.  If 
firm i sells its output on the spot market and assumes the risk of fluctuating 
prices, it can realize average profits of E(IT,)  and expected utility of E(U,(T,)J. 
Such a risk-averse firm would  prefer to join a pool that  spreads the risk  of 
seasonal price fluctuation and offers the firm the pool’s average price so that 
firm profits are guaranteed to be E(T,).  If the firm does not have to assume the 
risk of selling on the spot market. it realizes a utility of U,[E(n,)J,  higher than 
E[UZ(7r,)].  In fact, firm  i would be willing to pay up to y,,  the firm’s risk pre- 
mium, to participate in the pool, instead of having to sell on the spot market. 
The greater the expected variation  in prices, the greater the incentive for the 
firm to enter the pool. 
Figure 6.3B, however, describes the problem for pooling if firms differ with 
regard to price expectations. The pool faces a price range from p  to p  and a 
profit  range of  [~(p),  ~(p)].  Consider firm  i that  produces a variety  v  and 
expects a higher price range p,.  top  and a corresponding profit range of [~(p,,), 
~(p)].  If firm i joins the poo1,it  can guarantee itself a return of E(T)  and utility 
of Ut[E(r)].  However, given the distribution of prices and profits it faces, firm 
i would prefer to ship individually and realize E[U,(T,,)].  Such firms can only 
gain by pooling among themselves. In that case, firm i would realize U,[E(rJ], 
which is greater than E[U,(x!,)].  While small pools for different varieties and 
maturation dates may develop under the conditions illustrated, such pools may 
not be able to take advantage of the scale economies in transportation  or the 
public  goods  associated  with  the  marketing  opportunities  afforded  larger 
A more damaging problem, however, is if fruit maturities and varieties vary 
so significantly among growers that  seasonal price expectations are sharply 
different  within  the industry,  making widespread  seasonal  pooling  unlikely. 
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Fig. 6.3  The effect of heterogeneity on insurance gains from pooling: (A) 
incentives for growers to pool crops with a common price distribution; (B) 
incentives for growers to pool crops with different price distributions 
Under  those  circumstances,  it  will  be difficult  to generate much interest  in 
pooling  because  the pool’s guaranteed average price  may  not  exceed  what 
many growers expect to obtain by shipping independently. A related problem 
is that heterogeneous varieties and maturities also raise the costs of combining 
fruit into homogeneous pools for delivery and marketing. 207  Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal 
In  sum, the benefits ad  costs of  seasonal pooling  are determined by  (1) 
relatively  similar expected price patterns  during the  season for all  growers, 
where no one expects that their crop will be harvested when prices are high or 
low; (2) similar but variable maturation and harvest dates that can be predicted 
imprecisely for each grower; (3) uniform production  conditions with respect 
to variety, size, and quality; (4) limited geographical areas where oranges are 
produced; (5) easier policing of shipments due to distant markets or a single 
form of transportation; and (6) lower shipping costs associated with larger vol- 
ume shipments. 
6.4.2  Pooling in California and Florida 
Since the early development of the orange industry in the two states, pooling 
through  a formal cooperative was much more common in California than in 
Florida. Membership in the FCE was limited to a minority of large Florida 
growers in the most productive regions of the state, particularly Polk and Or- 
ange counties, and the organization remained controversial throughout its his- 
tory.5y  The CFGE, in comparison, had been dominant in California, with mem- 
bers  throughout  the  state. Cooperation among California  growers  also was 
promoted by the formation  of  irrigation districts, since all California groves 
had to be irrigated.60  Ongoing cooperation through irrigation districts appears 
to have lowered the transactions costs of bargaining to pool shipments and to 
implement and police marketing agreements. Additionally, the requirement for 
irrigation in California, restricting the geographic range of production, contrib- 
uted to the greater homogeneity of production  in that state as compared with 
Florida. 
In Florida, there was a large number of shippers, and most did not belong to 
a formal pooling cooperative. H. G. Hamilton shows that in 1941-42  in Flor- 
ida, 348 firms  shipped Florida  citrus:  300 were  independents and 48 were 
listed as organized cooperatives, some subexchanges for the FCE.61  California 
also had  a large number of  shippers, some 290 in  1934, but virtually  all of 
them were linked to either the CFGE or the MOD.h2 
The observed contrast in membership in pooling cooperatives between Cali- 
fornia and Florida existed despite the fact that growers in both  states faced 
similar seasonal price fluctuations, providing otherwise comparable incentives 
to pool for insurance purposes. For the period  1925-33,  the coefficient of vari- 
ation for monthly New York auction prices from October through June for both 
59. Hopkins 1960, 127-30. 
60. Citrus Lenves, April 1933, I; Citrogrnph, January 193  I, 96. 
61. Hamilton 1943, 3. 
62. Citrus Indust?,  May  1934, 5:  US. National Archives, Record  Group 145, Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, Central Correspondence File, box  161  : letter from W. C. Frackelton, 
Manager of the California-Arizona Citrus Marketing Agreement. to W. G. Meal, USDA,  I1 De- 
cember 1934. There were some 386 shippers in Florida and over 300 packing houses in  1930. The 
shippers included 54 cooperatives (Hamilton and Brooker 1939. 7). 208  Elizabeth Hoffman and Gary D. Libecap 
states was 0.353."'  Neither were pooling differences due to differences in the 
number or size distribution of farms in the two  There were approxi- 
mately nineteen thousand orange growers in both Florida and California.hs An 
examination of the size distribution of fruit farms drawn from the  1930 Ag- 
ricultural Census in the six major orange-producing counties of California and 
the twenty-one major orange-producing  counties of Florida that produced 97 
percent and 96 percent respectively of the crop, yields a coefficient of variation 
across farm sizes of  1.87 in California and 1.57 in Florida."h 
Accordingly,  we must look elsewhere to determine why  seasonal pooling 
was far more prevalent in California than in Florida. All things equal, seasonal 
pooling should be more common where there are uniform production  condi- 
tions and output that is similar with respect to variety, size, and quality. This 
clearly describes California's production, not Florida's. Not only did California 
produce only two varieties that did not compete with one another, but quality 
was uniformly high because of favorable and consistent growing conditions. 
Most production was concentrated in six adjacent southern California counties 
with most output from within  a radius of ninety  miles around Los Angeles, 
where climate and soil quality were relatively similar."' 
As noted  earlier, in California  oranges stored well  on the tree for two to 
three months, and the CFGE took advantage of this condition  and prorated 
harvests across growers throughout the season, picking only a portion of each 
grower's crop at any time. This practice ensured that each grower's fruit was 
sold throughout the season, so that no grower would differentially benefit or 
suffer from temporary price swings. This practice also served to enforce ship- 
ping restrictions. 
The situation was quite different in Florida, where orange production  was 
63. The data arc per box from the New York auction market as reported  in U.S.  Department of 
Agriculture (1934, 516, 517; 1940, 215, 216). 
64. The problems of differential bargaining positions due to tirm size (market share) alone that 
were encountered by  Wiggins and Libecap (1987) in their analysis of industry support for crude 
oil regulation  appear not to have been more serious in  Florida than in  California. 
65. U.S. Department of Commerce 1930,561-65,  720-25. 
66. In  1930, the twenty-one major orange-producing countics in Florida produced 9,357,270 
boxes of  oranges of  a state total  of  9,720,998, and the six major California counties produced 
41,960,140 boxes of the state total of43,140,726 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1930, 714-25,  561- 
65). The data for calculation of the size distribution of producers in each state are drawn from the 
1930 Agricultural  Census, which provides  size distributions for various categories of  farms. Al- 
though there is no separate category for orange or citrus farms, the census provides the number of 
fruit and orange farms in each county. For the leading counties of the two states, most fruit farms 
were orange farms. Thc coefficient  of  variation  was calculated for Florida and California using 
farm size intervals and numbers of farms in each category provided  in the 1930 Agricultural Cen- 
sus. The twenty-one Florida counties were Alachua, Brevard, Dade, De Soto, Hardee, Hernando, 
Highlands, Hillsborough, Indian  River, Lake, Lee, Manatee, Marion, Orange, Pasco, Pinellas, 
Polk, Putnam, St. Lucie, Seminole, and Volusia. The six leading California counties were  Los 
Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Tulare. and Ventura. 
67. Webber and Batchelor ( 1943, 73-82)  describe producing conditions (wcather, %oil,  insect, 
water) in the two states. Although there were differences between the coastal and interior growing 
regions of California, conditions appear to have been much less variable than in Florida. 209  Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal 
more broadly spread than in California. The Florida growing region was a rect- 
angle of  approximately  300 by  150 miles  with  varying  soil, drainage, and 
weather.68  These conditions contributed to differences in maturity, orange type, 
quality, and vulnerability to frost and wind damage. The twenty-one counties 
that accounted for most of Florida’s orange production in 1930  ranged through- 
out the central third of the state.6y 
In addition, Florida growers produced  a variety  of oranges, all competing 
for the winter market. Each of the five leading varieties had different maturing 
dates and different quality  characteristic^.^^' For example, Hamlin and Parson 
Brown oranges matured early, between October and December, while Pineap- 
ple and Homosassa oranges matured between  January and March.  Valencias 
matured  later in the spring.”  Early-maturing  oranges tended to be grown in 
northern counties that were more vulnerable to December frosts.’? In contrast 
to California, Florida oranges did not store well on the tree because of  climate 
conditions, and had to be harvested rapidly in order to avoid fruit drop.”  Thus, 
also in contrast to California, harvests in Florida could not be spaced across 
the season to even grower price expectations. Early fruit was harvested  and 
shipped in October and November; midseason fruit was shipped from Decem- 
ber through March; and late season fruit was shipped from April through June. 
Accordingly,  Florida  growers  had  specific  subseasons with  much narrower 
ranges of price expectations than did growers in California, who produced for 
the entire season. 
As illustrated in figure 6.3B, different  seasonal price expectations among 
growers reduced the incentive to engage in seasonal pooling. Generally, orange 
prices followed a U-shaped pattern across the season, high early in the season, 
low during the midseason, and high again late in the season. The mean per box 
prices for the three Florida  subseasons  for  1925-26  through  1932-33  were 
early (October-November)  $4.34;  mid  (January-February)  $3.8 1; and  late 
(May-June)  $4.89.74  Accordingly, producers of early-season varieties had little 
incentive to pool across subseasons. Because their fruit did not store well on 
the tree, they knew that their fruit would be harvested and sold at a time when 
prices were expected to be higher than later in the season. Moreover, they had 
no incentive to engage in activities that would smooth price fluctuations across 
68. Citrus Indusrv, May  1934, 5. 
69. Hopkins 1960.68. 
70. Thompson 1938,3;  Shuler and Townsend 1948,32-33. Shuler and Townsend provide tables 
of orange production by type and by county for 1948. Early and midseason varieties tended to be 
grown somewhat further north with Marion County, north of District 2, the fourth-largest producer. 
Valencia and other late-season varieties were grown in central and southern counties. 
71. Ziegler and Wolfe 197.5, 22-26;  Webber and Batchelor 1943, 505-30. 
72. Ziegler and Wolfe 1975, 86. 
73. Webber and Batchelor 1943, 82. 
74. The mean prices were calculated from monthly data from the New York  auction market as 
reported in  U.S. Department of  Agriculture (1934. 516, 517; 1940, 215, 216). They are for the 
leading months in each subseason, to avoid transition  months between subseasons. 210  Elizabeth Hoffman and Gary D. Libecap 
the entire season. Such activities would only serve to lower their expected re- 
turns. 
These conditions help to explain why seasonal pooling of  fruit through for- 
mal cooperatives was much less common in Florida than  in California. The 
variety  of  types  of  oranges with differing  maturing  dates and qualities  also 
prohably  raised  the costs of  combining  oranges into a meaningful  seasonal 
pool in Florida relative to California,  where fruit was more ~niform.’~  This 
discussion indicates that, while different price expectations across varieties re- 
duced the incentives to pool fruit in Florida, heterogeneous producing condi- 
tions and output certainly raised the costs of pooling. 
We also argued that pooling  should be more common where markets are 
distant and shipping costs are high, but subject to reductions with larger vol- 
ume shipments. This applied in general to both California  and Florida. New 
York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia were major and distant markets for 
producers  in both  states. California growers  relied  on  railroad  shipment  in 
large car lots, negotiated and organized by the CFGE and MOD. Those Florida 
growers whose oranges were shipped to the upper Midwest and to the North- 
east also relied upon railroads or a combination of railroad and boat shipments 
in  large  car lots. Crops were combined at packing  houses  for transport  via 
railroad or railroad and boat to distant markets, but unlike California, Florida 
growers did not rely  solely upon pooling  organizations  for these shipments. 
Independent shippers also combined their oranges for bulk shipments north.’“ 
Truck shipments were increasingly an option for some Florida growers in 
the 1930s for nearby markets in the South Atlantic and South Central states, 
as vehicles and highways improved. Between 1934 and 1936, some 14 percent 
of Florida shipments went to those two regions, although only a portion went 
by truck. While  11 percent of  the Florida crop was shipped in  small lots by 
truck in 1931,  by the 1940-41  season some 24 percent went by truck.”  Califor- 
nia growers had fewer  opportunities  to use trucks,  since the  San Francisco 
and Los Angeles markets, the only ones close enough, given the condition of 
highways in the 1930s, accounted for only 11 percent of California shipments 
between  1934 and 1936.78 
Truck shipments no doubt raised policing costs in monitoring quota compli- 
ance, and these problems would have existed in both states. With greater op- 
portunities for truck shipments in Florida, the difficulties presented for polic- 
ing cartel efforts were likely greater. Further, the strength of the CFGE limited 
out-of-state rail shipments to a few collection points in California. Boat ship- 
ments through the Panama Canal were not a competitive option. In Florida, 
growers relied upon independent shippers, rather than large pooling organiza- 
tions, long before trucking became an option in the 1930s. Unlike the CFGE, 
75. Ziegler and Wolfe  1975, 2 19-29. 
76. Joubert 1943. 
77. Cirrus Industry, January  1933, 6; Joubert 1943. 3 
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the FCE had never controlled a majority of the state’s shipments, and it could 
not limit the number of rail and boat collection points. Of course, with a larger 
growing area and the availability of nearby ocean shipping, the costs of main- 
taining such restrictions would have been much higher. 
These arguments suggest that, although California growers had strong in- 
centives to engage in seasonal pools (and did so), many Florida growers had 
fewer reasons to take part in such pools (and did not). Because of lower ex- 
pected returns and higher costs from pooling, Florida growers and shippers 
relied on independent,  spot exchanges to market fruit. Cooperative  pooling 
arrangements through the CFGE became the organizational basis for the regu- 
lation of  shipments through  the marketing orders in  California,  but pooling 
under the FCE was not extensive enough in Florida to play that role. Addition- 
ally, the growing opportunity to ship oranges by truck from Florida raised po- 
licing costs for cartel efforts. 
6.5  Agency-Constituent Negotiations in the Implementation of 
Regulation: The Florida Marketing Agreement 
Table 6.3 summarizes the marketing agreements attempted  in Florida be- 
tween  1933 and  1939  and  lists  the  1933  CalifornidArizona  marketing 
agreement for comparison. As noted, the  1933 marketing agreements in each 
state were based on the CFGE, or California, model. They called for weekly 
prorationing of interstate orange shipments as set by  the industry administra- 
tive committee. Quotas to individual shippers were determined by  a “prorate 
base” assigned to each shipper on the basis of the amount of fruit held under 
contract with growers at the beginning of  the season.79  The prorate base was 
the shipper’s fraction of total  seasonal orange shipments from the state, and 
multiplying  it times  the  authorized  weekly  total  determined  each  shipper’s 
weekly quota. 
This prorationing rule emphasized  long-term,  seasonal contracts between 
growers and shippers as to when fruit would be picked and shipped and the 
division of returns. It posed an immediate threat to independent Florida grow- 
ers and shippers who relied on short-term, spot, cash exchanges for fruit when- 
ever market conditions warranted.  As designed by the marketing agreement, 
however, these transactions did not qualify for determining the shipper’s pro- 
rate base. A shipper with no seasonal contracts would have a zero prorate base, 
and hence would receive no weekly quota. Typically, only growers and ship- 
pers who were part of seasonal pools engaged in such contracts, since pooling 
cooperatives like the  FCE relied  on long-term  arrangements  to manage the 
flow of shipments throughout the season. 
Florida independent  shippers and growers strongly objected to this prora- 
79. Shippers generally paid 20 percent down to secure the contract (Ockey 1936, 34, 37; Citrus 
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Table 6.3  Federal Citrus Marketing Agreements in Florida and Californial 
Arizona 
Florida  California 
1st mcirketing ugreement 








2d murkering agreement 








3d murketing agreernrrit 








4th murkering ugreement 







Fruit contracted for at beginning 
Yes (federal inspection) 
No 
Yea 
9 shippers, 4 growers selectcd 
of season 




Fruit contracted for at beginning 
of season. or average of past 
2 years'  shipments 
Yes (federal inspection): no fruit 
below U.S. grade 2 
No 
Yes 
7 growers, 6 shippers named by 
USDA Secretary 
518136-113  1/31 
1936-37 
Yes 
Fruit contracted for at beginning 
of season, or average of  past 
3 years'  shipments 
Yes (federal inspection); no fruit 
below US.  grade 2 
No 
n.a. 
Florida Citrus Commission: 7 
growers, 4 shippers, 
appointed by  governor 







Fruit contracted for at 




Distribution  committee: 8 
Growers advisory committee: 8 
shippers elected 
growers elected 213  Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal 




Grade and size regulation 
Shipping holiday  Yes 
National proration  ma. 
Control committee 
Yes (federal inspection); no fruit 
below USDA grade 2 
Florida Citrus Commission: 7 
growers, 4 shippers, 
appointed by governor 
~  ~  ~  ~~~ 
Sources: Benedict and Stine 1956, 382-86;  Ockey  1936, 5-42;  Citrus Industp, November 1933, 
6; September 1935, 6; March  1936. 8; Citrus Lenvrs, November  1935,6;  April  1936, I. 
tioning rule that was designed to force them into formal pooling arrangements. 
They also objected to the assignment of quotas by the Florida Control Commit- 
tee, appointed by the secretary of agriculture and dominated by the FCE. Addi- 
tionally,  independent  growers  were  concerned  that  the  prorationing  rules 
would not sufficiently recognize differences in maturity dates, which were so 
important  in Florida.Rn  If  prorationing  limits  on shipments were  tight  when 
particular growers’ fruit was ripe, those growers and their shippers would bear 
more of the costs of regulation than would those growers whose fruit matured 
at times when prorationing rules were less binding. For example, growers in 
the southwestern part of Florida, where oranges matured early, claimed that 
prorationing would “unfairly” force them to hold their fruit too long.8’ 
Independent growers and shippers organized under the FCHA, and circu- 
lated a competing marketing order in 1933, but it was not adopted by the secre- 
tary of  agriculture.82  There was general agreement in Florida that some form 
of federal regulation  was desirable. The issue was the form regulation would 
take. For example, James. C. Morton, vice president of  the FCHA, wrote to 
Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, 27 November 1933, to protest “the 
inequitable restrictions of the prorate clauses in the Agreement.” Nevertheless, 
he called for modification  of  the proposed agreement,  not its abandonment: 
“The situation in Florida is acute. The need of a Marketing Agreement’s being 
put into operation at the earliest possible date is imperative, but quite a large 
proportion of the industry, both grower and shipper, recognizing the menace to 
80. Citrus Leuves, October  1933, 3, 4, 11-20;  Citrus Industry, August  1933, 16; November 
81. Citrus Leaves, November 1936, 7; Citrus Industp, June 1938, 12. 
82. US.  National Archives, Record Group 145, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Cen- 
tral Correspondence File, box 362: “Proposed Amendments, California Arizona Agreement,’’ 9 
November  1933; box 362: telegrams and letters from James C. Morton, Florida Citrus Growers 
Clearing House Association. to J. W.  Tapp, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and R. G. 
Tugwell, USDA, 10 December 1933, 12 December 1933; letter from thirteen growers to Secretary 
Henry Wallace, USDA, 27 December 1933; letter from A. M. Prevatt, a Florida grower, to Secre- 
tary Henry Wallace, USDA, 28 December 1933; letter from 0.  G. Strauss of the Florida Control 
Committee to Jasper Wolfe, a Florida shipper, 22 March 1934. 
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which they believe to be their best interests, are determined to protect them- 
selves through the courts if necessary.”83 
Instead of  prorationing rules, the independents favored the use of shipping 
holidays  and  quality  restrictions  to  loosely  regulate  shipments  to  smooth 
prices. Shipping holidays could block all deliveries from the state for a speci- 
fied period of  time to alleviate temporary market gluts. Size and quality stan- 
dards could be set to deny shipment of  fruit that fell below the standard, and 
the standard could be adjusted from time to time to provide flexible restraints. 
Quality  standards  also provided  some industry-wide  public  goods in  main- 
taining product rep~tation.~~  Enforcement for both policies would involve in- 
spection and monitoring of all deliveries across state lines, rather than insuring 
individual quota compliance, as was necessary under prorationing. 
Because  shipping holidays  and quality standards generally  applied across 
the board, the distributional consequences were less severe than those associ- 
ated with the proposed  allocation of  quotas under the marketing  order pro- 
posed by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Quality constraints did 
harm marginal growers with low-quality fruit, but thosc growers appeared not 
to be  sufficiently  influential  to  block  their use.  Shipping holidays  typically 
were short enough so as not to cause serious losses. Moreover, these altema- 
tives did not require membership in organized cooperatives.  An example of 
broad-based  support for shipping holidays in Florida is the 6 February  1933 
call by the FCE, the FCHA, and other shippers for a six-day shipping holiday 
in order to raise prices.us 
The 1933 marketing agreement was challenged  in federal district court al- 
most  immediately  by  two  shippers, Hillsborough  Packing  and  Lake  Fern 
Groves (Yarnell v. Hillsborough Packing  Co., 70 F  2d 435). An  injunction 
against prorationing was issued on 18 January 1934 by Judge Alexander Aker- 
man in the southern district in Tampa, who ruled that the marketing order under 
the secretary of agriculture was unconstitutional.  Prorationing controls by the 
Florida Control Committee were temporarily halted. Although the injunction 
was removed on 10 February  1934 by an appellate court and the ruling was 
reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on 14  April 
83. US.  National Archives, Record Group 145, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Cen- 
tral Correspondence Files box 362. 
84. With more heterogeneous fruit, reputation was a particular concern for Florida growers with 
respect to their California competitors. Because Florida oranges often had traces of green in their 
skins, unlike the more uniformly golden California navels, fruit was often dyed in Florida. See 
Florida Citrus Inspection Bureau  1938, 157, for data on “color-added’ oranges. As with any re- 
striction, controls based on shipping holidays and quality standards would have distributional ef- 
fccts. Those growers who had planned to ship their crops at the time of a shipping holiday would 
suffer. Nevertheless, shipping holidays had  much broader  support among Florida  growers and 
shippers than did prorationing. 
85. Cirrus Industry, February 1933, 5. Growers in both California and Florida also pushed for 
marketing programs to expand total demand for oranges and purchases by  the Federal Surplus 
Commodities Corporation  to help reduce  total  supplies (Cirrus Industry,  November  1936, 5). 
These programs were popular because neither required industry agreement on quota allocations, 
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1934, the injunction was applied at the height of  the Florida orange season, 
and it raised uncertainty about the future of prorationing.86 
Both shippers objected to the design of the prorationing rule, but for differ- 
ent reasons. Lake Fern Groves shipped very high quality fruit and hence pre- 
ferred reliance on grade and size restrictions to control shipments instead of 
volume restrictions through prorationing. Hillsborough, on the other hand, en- 
gaged  in  periodic  cash purchases  under  short-term  contracts  with  growers, 
rather than participating  in a pool. It was precisely this kind of  shipper that 
would be disadvantaged by a quota rule that assigned shipments based on long- 
term  contracts  struck  at the  start of  the  season.*'  The prorationing  rule re- 
mained so controversial that the first marketing agreement for Florida oranges 
was terminated in August  1934. 
Throughout  the  summer and  fall of  1934, members  of  the  FCE and  the 
FCHA corresponded with officials of the Agricultural Adjustment Administra- 
tion regarding the redrafting of the marketing agreement.88  A second market- 
ing agreement was initiated December 1934. There were two minor modifica- 
tions in the order, but the Department of  Agriculture continued  to maintain 
the basic prorationing framework.Xy  Past shipments were to be given greater 
emphasis  in  designing  quotas,  but  the  weights  assigned  to  fruit controlled 
through long-term contracts and past shipments were left to the Florida Control 
Committee. This naturally became a point of contention, given the makeup of 
the ~ommittee.~" 
During  1934 and  1935, there  were  conflicts  over the  membership  of  the 
committee and demands for access to its records in prorationing  allocation^.^' 
86. The constitutional issues raised by  Judge Akerman and the hostility to the AAA arc dis- 
cussed in Irons 1982, 142-49. 
87. Cirrus lndusry, February 1934, 10; U.S. National Archives, Record Group 145, Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, Central Correspondence Files box 362: letter from J. A.  Yamell of 
the Florida Control Commission to P.  R. Porter, USDA, 22 January 1934; letter from W.  G. Meal, 
USDA, to 0.  G. Strauss, Florida Control Commission, 24 January 1934; letter from P.  R. Taylor, 
USDA, to J. H. Treadwell, a Florida grower, 29 January 1934; letter from Rex Tugwcll, USDA, to 
U.S. Attorney General, 2 February 1934; memo for Arthur Bachrach from W.  G. Meal, USDA, 15 
February 1934. 
88. For example, see letter to Porter R. Taylor, General Crops Section, Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration, from James Harrison of the FCHA, 15 May  1934, and letter to W.  G. Meal and 
A. W.  McKay,  General  Crops  Section,  Agricultural  Adjustment  Administration,  from  0.  G. 
Strauss, Secretary of  the Florida Control Committee  and aligncd with the FCE,  14 May  1934 
(National Archives, Record Group 145, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Central Corre- 
spondence Files box 362). 
89. See U.S. National Archives, Record Group 145, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 
Central Correspondence Files box 362: draft of  Florida Citrus Agreement, 10 March 1936. 
90. Cirrus Leaves, November 1934,6. 
91. U.S. National Archives, Record Group 145, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Cen- 
tral Correspondence File, box 362: letter from A. W.  McKay, Agricultural Adjustment Administra- 
tion, to C. L. Bundy, a Florida grower,  1  November 1934; box  12: letter from James C. Morton, 
Florida Citrus Growers Clearing House Association, to Henry Wallace, 10 November 1934; box 
363: letter to Henry Wallace from James C. Morton, Florida Citrus Growers Clearing House Asso- 
ciation, 27  November 1934; letter to C. M. Brown, California grower, from P.  R. Taylor, 14 No- 
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In the face of continued opposition, the second marketing agreement for Flor- 
ida oranges was terminated  15 July  1935. In the meantime, state legislation, 
creating  a Florida  Citrus Commission  and  authorizing  shipment  regulation 
based  on quality and size standards, was irn~lemented.~’  The Florida Citrus 
Commission, named by the governor, was created to take the place of the con- 
troversial federal control commission, named by  the secretary of agricu1tu1-e.~~ 
A third marketing order was not put into place until May 1936, ten months 
after the termination of the second order and after the 1935-36  shipping season 
had passed. As before, the Department of Agriculture maintained prorationing 
of orange shipments as the primary method of regulation. The proration rule 
continued to emphasize fruit contracted for or purchased at the beginning of 
the season, but it placed more weight on past shipments. Nevertheless, as with 
the earlier marketing orders, conflicts continued over the assignment of quotas 
and department efforts to force membership in cooperative pools. Court chal- 
lenges of the prorationing rules brought conflicting opinions by federal district 
judge Holland in Miami, who sustained the marketing agreement in February 
1937, and Judge Akerman in Tampa, who issued an injunction against it in 
March  1937.y4  The third marketing order for Florida oranges was terminated 
31 July 1937. 
Over a year of negotiation between the Agricultural Adjustment Administra- 
tion and the Florida industry was necessary before a final and successful mar- 
keting order was implemented on 22 February  1939. The new marketing order 
contained  no quota rules or prorationing  provisions.  Regulation instead fo- 
cused on uniform grade and size restrictions and shipping holidays, the frame- 
work originally demanded by independents in the FCHA. 
6.6  Implications of the Failure of the Orange Cartel 
In  1933, the federal government  undertook cartelization  of  agriculture in 
response to a crisis of falling farm prices and incomes. There was confidence 
within  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Administration  that  the  farm  problem 
could be successfully resolved  through  mandated price inflation. It was not. 
Efforts to reduce output or to control shipments for most commodities failed 
to reduce supply sufficiently to raise prices to their target parity levels. In the 
face of slack demand, continued growth in production, and political opposition 
to tighter output constraints, the federal government increasingly turned to al- 
ternative methods of raising farm incomes that were politically more palatable. 
92. Florida Citrus Inspection Bureau 1936, 5-53. 
93. Citrus Leaves, April  1936, I; June 1936, 3. 
94. Citrus Leaves, May 1937, 9. US.  National Archives, Record Group 145, Agricultural Ad- 
justment Administration, Central Correspondence File, box 257: Florida Citrus Exchange Bulletin 
to all district and association managers, 29 January  1937; letter from Henry A. Wallace, USDA, 
to L. P.  Kirkland, Florida Citrus Control Committee, 27 March  1937; press release, USDA, 27 
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Various  subsidies  were  adopted,  and  price  support  programs  were  imple- 
mented  whereby  the  government purchased  surpluses  to  protect  minimum 
prices. A complex web of  agricultural regulations, specialized for each crop, 
gradually was put into place after 1933, and most remain today, protected by 
well-organized interest groups and their political sponsors.95 
The examination of negotiations between the Florida industry and the Ag- 
ricultural Adjustment Administration from 1933 to 1939 to implement the or- 
ange marketing agreements shows how difficult it was to cartelize agriculture, 
even under  relatively  favorable  circumstances.  Heterogeneous  interests  and 
conflicts over quota rules prevented  the weekly prorationing of  interstate or- 
ange shipments from Florida  and the  installation of  a national  prorationing 
framework for controlling shipments from Florida, California, and Texas. If  a 
nationwide cartel could not be assembled for oranges, it most surely could not 
be assembled for wheat or corn. Hence, as agricultural regulation continued to 
develop, the emphasis was shifted to different ways of raising farm incomes. 
The study also shows that an understanding of the actual content of regula- 
tion and its economic impact often requires going beyond the formal legisla- 
tion to agency-constituent negotiations. This seems to be particularly the case 
for New Deal regulatory legislation, which was quite vague compared to more 
recent legislation. More discretion was delegated by  Congress to administra- 
tive agencies in defining regulatory  policy beyond the broad mandates of the 
enabling statutes. This delegation was by  plan because of  the immediacy  of 
the Depression, a lack of agreement in Congress and in the administration as 
to the appropriate means to achieve policy goals, and a belief in the ability of 
technically  trained, independent  administrators to devise effective programs 
through consultation with organized industry groups. For example, the AAA 
provides little detail on how marketing agreements for specialty crops would 
be drafted. The rhetoric surrounding enactment of the act, however, suggests 
an expectation of  rapid, smooth adoption. This did not occur; the marketing 
agreements for oranges, for instance, took six years to negotiate, and they did 
not achieve the  strict cartelization goals of  the AAA.96  Analysis of the bar- 
gaining among the California and Florida industries and the Agricultural Ad- 
justment Administration  makes  clearer why the marketing  agreements  took 
95. There is entrenched backing for marketing orders from influential constituents and the De- 
partment of Agriculture. If the marketing orders were dropped, some growers would suffer capital 
losses. The Office of Management and Budget, Federal Trade Commission, and Department of 
Agriculture have riders to appropriations legislation, prohibiting the use of government funds for 
investigation of the antitrust elements of marketing orders and for support of investigations under 
the Freedom of Information Act. 
96. The restraints  in  California have been binding. More fruit was produced  than could be 
shipped fresh under the California regulations. Between 1978 and  1983, only 60 percent of  the 
California navel crop was allowed to be delivered for fresh fruit consumption; the remaining was 
directed to processing, although navels are not well suited for juice production. Some fruit was 
never harvested. When the marketing order was temporarily suspended during the 1984-85  sea- 
son, the spread between FOB and retail prices narrowed. For analysis see Thompson and Lyon 
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very different forms in California and Florida and why national prorationing 
was not adopted. 
The delegation of  authority to agency officials and industry representatives 
that characterized important early New Deal legislation suggests that agency 
capture was a likely o~tcome.'~  Although capture is often associated with the 
diversion of a previously independent regulatory agency from public to private 
interests, such a narrow view is not necessary for understanding when capture 
is possible. In the case of  New Deal legislation, agencies such as the Agricul- 
tural Adjustment  Administration  were supposed to be captured; that is, they 
were directed to work closely with industry representatives to design cartels. 
This collaboration was perceived to be in the public interest in order to carry 
out government policy. Even so, policies in the broad industry's interests could 
not always be devised. In the case of the orange industry, serious disagreement 
within the Florida industry prevented the development of a consistent agency 
policy  and hence  the  achievement  of  cartelization  goals. Accordingly,  the 
strength of agency-capture arguments appears to depend critically on the cohe- 
siveness of the industry to be regulated. 
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